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HARMONY AMONG THE PEOPLE: TORTS AND
INDIAN COURTS
James W. Zion*
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal systems of Indian peoples were based upon the idea
of maintaining harmony in the family, the camp, and the commu-
nity. During the time before contact with Europeans and before
Indian nations were confined to reservations, reserves, and the
poor districts of cities, Indian groups had many sophisticated
methods for halting bitter disputes and reconciling wrongdoers to
the community.' The methods of achieving these difficult goals
were many, but they were often based upon an acceptance of reli-
gious values and ways of making individuals accept the need for
good relations with others. Often social control was expressed in
terms of the moral precepts of doing things in a good way or being
in harmony with the universe.
Following the imposition of reservation courts upon Indian na-
tions, Indian communities were forced to accept different methods
of handling disputes-new methods based upon English and Amer-
ican customs embodied in the common law and criminal regula-
tions.2 Those new methods were forced upon Indians in an attempt
to "civilize" them, and the old systems of enforcing community
harmony were disrupted or destroyed in some communities.
Over time, notwithstanding the conscious efforts of the United
States government to destroy Indian cultures, the old ways have
persisted in many tribes, and today there is a revival of those old
ways.' Not only have they been remembered, but they have gained
* B.A., College of St. Thomas, 1966; J.D., Catholic University, 1969. Mr. Zion, a for-
mer Solicitor to the Courts of the Navajo Nation, presently resides in Helena, Montana,
where he is General Counsel of the National American Indian Court Judges Association.
This article was originally prepared, in a different form, for the Conference on Con-
tracts and Torts of the National American Indian Court Judges Association in Gallup, New
Mexico, in 1982. In the hope that information and ideas about tribal courts will be dissemi-
nated to the widest possible extent, the author makes no claim of copyright to any part of
this article.
1. See Mandelbaum, The Plains Cree, in 37 ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF THE AMERI-
CAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY 230, 232 (1940); G. GRINNELL, BLACKFOOT LODGE TALES
220 (1962); Van Valkenburgh, Navajo Common Law (pts. 1, 2, & 3), 9 MUSEUM NOTES 17
(1936), 10 MUSEUM NOTES 51 (1937), 11 MUSEUM NOTES 37 (1938).
2. W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES (1966); F. PRUCHA, AMERICANIZING THE AMER-
ICAN INDIANS (1978); Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code, and the Police
Idea in American Indian Policy, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 25 (Rosen ed. 1976).
3. V. DUSENBERRY, THE MONTANA CREE (1962); A. HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE
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a new vigor because of the longing of Indian peoples for dignity
through the use of their own cultural ways.
Tort law is a good subject to use as an example of how Indian
cultures are interpreting general Anglo-American values, and how
Indian culture can be applied in the context of Indian court sys-
tems, which are generally patterned after American state and fed-
eral courts. Tort law has been developed through social theory; the
needs of society have affected the growth of specific rules.4 Individ-
ual Indian justice systems should reflect the social trends of their
own tribes as found in customs and traditions, and Indian judges
should be looking to identify the needs of their societies when de-
veloping rules of tribal law.
The various tribal courts are struggling to meet demands that
they use general American common law and state statutes, but
they are also being asked to provide justice as defined by the needs
and expectations of their own Indian communities. General Ameri-
can tort law is being tempered to serve an increasingly complex
society, and tribal courts are seeking appropriate ways to apply the
outside law to their own peoples. The attempt to use alien legal
principles that do not fit Indian needs or values has created many
conflicts within the tribal courts. One means of resolving those
conflicts is the development of Indian common law indigenous to
each Indian nation.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN TRIBAL COURTS
While Indian justice systems predated the English common
law system transplanted into America, assimilationist theories of
the United States Indian policy largely created today's Indian jus-
tice systems. 5 Once the policy of negotiating treaties with the In-
dian nations and confining them to reservations had been imple-
mented in the nineteenth century, the United States tackled the
new problem of "civilizing" the Indian in preparation for
assimilation.
One of the actors in the legislative and policy efforts to deal
with reservation Indians was Henry M. Teller. Teller was elected
to the United States Senate in 1876, representing Colorado, and he
took an active interest in Indian affairs.' Teller was appointed Sec-
AMERICAN INDIANS (1976); J. JORGENSEN, THE SUN DANCE RELIGION (1972).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1416 (4th ed. 1971).
5. An estimated 18 traditional courts are still in existence, most of them long-standing
systems of the Pueblos of the Southwest. B. MORSE, INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A MODEL FOR CANADA? 11 (1980).
6. W. HAGAN, supra note 2, at 107.
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retary of the Interior in 1882, and one of his first acts of office was
to write to Hiram Price, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to
make some suggestions about dealing with reservation Indians.
The principle thing that bothered Teller, which he complained of
in the letter, was "a great hindrance to the civilization of the Indi-
ans, viz, the continuance of the old heathenish dances."8 Teller re-
minded Price that feasts, dances and other traditional Indian prac-
tices interfered with the "civilizing" process. Teller asked that
Price formulate rules to abolish traditional feasts and dances, regu-
late marriage and divorce, prohibit the practices of medicine men
("who are always found with the anti-progressive party"), and
teach the value of property.'
By the spring of 1883, Price had worked out a plan acceptable
to Teller, and on April 30, 1883, Teller approved rules for Courts
of Indian Offenses. 10 In 1892, the rules were repromulgated, and
they provided for Indian judges in at least three districts of a res-
ervation." The judges were to be "men of intelligence, integrity,
and good moral character, and preference shall be given to Indians
who read and write English readily, wear citizens' dress, and en-
gage in civilized pursuits."'" Polygamists were specifically excluded
from judgeships. The rules provided for appeals to a three-judge
Indian panel, and the crimes to be prosecuted and punished in-
cluded: (1) engaging in certain traditional dances; (2) plural or po-
lygamous marriage; (3) practicing as a medicine man; (4) theft and
property destruction; (5) "immorality," including payment of a
brideprice for traditional marriage; (6) intoxication and the intro-
duction of intoxicants; and (7) misdemeanors defined by state or
territorial law, with the offenses of refusing to perform road duty
and vagrancy thrown in for good measure.'"
Another interesting aspect of the rules was the provision that
"[a]ll mixed bloods and white persons who are actually and law-
fully members, whether by birth or adoption, of any tribe residing
on the reservation shall be counted as Indians."1 4 This shows that
as of 1892 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recognized tradi-
7. Id. at 107-08.
8. Teller, Courts of Indian Offenses, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS 295-96
(F. Prucha ed. 1978).
9. Id. at 296-99.
10. W. HAGAN, supra note 2, at 109.
11. Morgan, Rules for Indian Courts, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS 300-01
(F. Prucha ed. 1978).
12. Id. at 301.
13. Id. 302-05.
14. Id. at 301.
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tional membership standards of Indian peoples as well as the ex-
tension of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This suggests
that Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe15 was wrong in holding
that Indian tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
members and that such jurisdiction was not recognized in the past.
The Courts of Indian Offenses became popularly known as
"C.F.R. Courts," named for the Code of Federal Regulations.
While Indian courts began under the authority of rules of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Snyder Act of 1921 recognized
them as a statutory matter, authorizing the Commissioner to em-
ploy Indian judges.'"
The Indian Reorganization Act provided for a new kind of In-
dian court when it made provision for tribes to adopt constitutions
fixing governing powers. 17 Many tribes adopted constitutions that
either established tribal courts as a branch of government or made
provision for establishing them by resolution or ordinance. Tribal
governments gradually took steps to remove their courts from fed-
eral control, and now there are 117 tribal courts and twenty-three
Courts of Indian Offenses in operation in the United States.18
The legal authority of Indian courts has been tested at times.
In 1934, parties to a suit in the traditional Seneca Nation Peace-
maker's Court attempted to restrain those proceedings in a federal
action. The federal district court held that Indian courts are
"courts of a foreign jurisdiction, over which we have no control."' 9
The case also found that tribal courts and not federal courts have
the right to determine internal affairs, unless Congress bestows
such jurisdiction on the latter.
In 1956, an attack on the Pine Ridge Oglala Sioux Court as-
serted that since Indian courts are not provided for in the United
States Constitution, they can have no power.2 0 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held "that not only do the Indian Tribal Courts
have inherent jurisdiction over all matters not taken over by the
federal government, but that federal legislative action and rules
promulgated thereunder support the authority of the Tribal
Courts."'"
Thus the federal judiciary has recognized sister forums of the
15. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
16. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1983).
17. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1983).
18. The figures are those of Ralph Gonzales, the Judicial Services officer of the Bureau
of National Affairs. See 9 INDIAN COURTS NEWSLEmrER 7 (1983).
19. Washburn v. Parker, 7 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1934).
20. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
21. Id. at 96.
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various Indian nations as tribal courts, and the authority of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs under his statutory powers has
been held to include establishing the Courts of Indian Offenses.2
One hundred years after the establishment of Courts of Indian
Offenses on April 30, 1883, there has been a shift away from fed-
eral paternalism and attempts to "civilize" Indians through the
laws applied on reservations. The Indian courts are now becoming
aware of their inherent authority and powers, and they are exercis-
ing them.23 Indian courts are clearly competent, and as is the case
with state courts, they normally exercise general subject matter ju-
risdiction. The problem is that tribal courts have assumed the
trappings and form of state courts, and the question has been
asked whether that is appropriate.
The Indians of the United States have the choices of Courts of
Indian Offenses (under federal control), Western-style tribal
courts, traditional courts or systems, or combinations of all of
them. Justice is often the product of fulfilled expectations, and the
problem with Indian courts is finding those expectations and satis-
fying them.
III. ANGLO-EUROPEAN CUSTOM IS USED IN U.S. COURTS, So WHY
CAN'T TRIBAL CUSTOM BE USED IN INDIAN COURTS?
The law of torts is a product of history, and many of its doc-
trines are founded on principles of common law developed over the
centuries."' There is some debate over the use of tribal custom in
Indian courts,25 but a large amount of American law is, in theory if
not in fact, based upon the idea of "Anglo-European custom."
Sir Matthew Hale, examining English law in a comprehensive
fashion in the mid-seventeenth century, said there were certain
"unwritten laws or customs" called the common law that have ob-
tained their force by "immemorial usage or custom."26 Sir William
Blackstone agreed that the common law was a collection of ancient
maxims and customs, and said that a custom is "good" and a part
of the common law where it has been observed for "time out of
mind" or "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
22. See also Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965); 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1983).
23. See, e.g., Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Navajo Rep. 159 (Ct. App. 1982), holding that Nav-
ajo courts are courts of inherent jurisdiction that have inherent authority to exercise juris-
diction over non-Indians in civil cases.
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 19-21.
25. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 2, at 51, 56-60.
26. 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 12 (5th ed. 1974).
19841 269
5
Zion: Indian Courts
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1984
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
contrary. ' 27 For him the common law consisted of general customs,
used throughout a country, or particular customs, used by the peo-
ple in a certain area.28
We are well aware that the custom origin of American com-
mon law is largely a false justification for it, and that American
judges have often ignored the prior legal customs of the European
settlers in order to develop a truly American law based upon the
needs of Americans.29 Whatever the historical or legal accuracy is
of custom as a basis for common law, the important point is that
American judges have historically developed flexible rules of law,
keeping the needs and expectations of their communities fully in
mind.
The law of torts is a particular example of a legal method
founded upon and affected by the needs of society and the neces-
sity of balancing the interests of different parts of that society.30
The law of torts has become a means of trying to keep the general
American society in balance and harmony, and that is precisely the
thing early Indian systems did.
When the Indian judge gets to the real foundation of the law,
he or she will realize that law was meant to fit the needs of the
people who come before the Indian court. In 1881, a young lawyer
by the name of Oliver Wendell Holmes stepped to a lecture plat-
form in Boston, Massachusetts, and began a series of public lec-
tures that made people begin to think differently about law. He
opened the lecture series with these words:
The life of the law has not been logic: It has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.8"
The experience Holmes said was the foundation of law can
mean a great deal in the tribal situation. It can be an experience
founded upon ancient traditions developed over centuries of strug-
gle with nature, or it can be the experience of Indian judges and
lawyers acting against backgrounds formed by the very different
life of an Indian reservation. The rules of Indian traditions cer-
tainly developed out of a long experience and, when looked at
27. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 67 (Chitty ed. 1966).
28. Id.
29. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17-25 (1973).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 15-16.
31. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
[Vol. 45
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closely, they often make a great deal of sense. Indians also devel-
oped a number of practices and beliefs after tribes were confined
to reservations, to fit the changed conditions the people had to
face.3 2 Coming from reservation cultures forced to adapt in special
protective ways, Indian judges should be free to develop rules
based upon the Indian experience and the expectations of their
own people.
Indian courts are already taking steps to develop their own in-
terpretations of law based upon community need. Many tribal
courts order time payments on judgments, taking the defendant's
income and assets into account." This is not the normal procedure
in American state courts, unless done as a matter of settlement.
Unless a defendant has the advantage of liberal execution exemp-
tion statutes or is able to negotiate time payments, the rigors of
property and wage executions typically are carried out. The Indian
court has a more rational approach to making certain judgments
are satisfied, in which the plaintiff benefits from assurances of be-
ing paid and the defendant is required to live up to his legal obli-
gation in a way he can afford. The reality is that in poor communi-
ties seizures of property by a tribal police officer are completely
ineffectual because defendants often lack major assets, equity in
property, and bank accounts. Indian judges have used their experi-
ence to solve a problem that would otherwise make creditors refuse
credit to Indians or cause popular dissatisfaction with the courts.
Indian judges have found ways around the strict and harsh ap-
plication of "law and order" regulations. In some areas criminal
laws have been applied in a "civil" manner to take care of property
disputes. In other areas Indian judges would refuse to carry out
criminal law but would handle matters in more traditional ways."
One part of the reservation experience is the possibility that the
rules and requirements of White outsiders can be avoided by a
number of clever devices. Indian courts have a long experience in
modifying the harshness of Anglo-European law and its inappro-
priate use, but unfortunately there has been a hesitance to move
on to develop positive Indian common law.
What must be recognized is that there are valuable principles
and rules of the common law of individual Indian peoples that can
and should be used. Some of these may be applicable in much the
32. Among these developments are protective devices such as Pow-Wows, the Gourd
Dance, the Enemy Way of the Navajo, the Sun Dance, and the Native American Church.
33. The author has observed this practice in tribal courts of the Navajo, Blackfeet,
and Salish-Kootenai Tribes.
34. Barsh & Henderson, supra note 2, at 39, 42.
1984]
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same way they were used in pre-reservation society, while others
will need to be modified to fit existing situations and Indian court
procedures. The point is that there are principles that should be
found and used.
Three examples of traditional legal principles may be valuable
to an understanding of how an Indian court should operate. In
Cree tradition, when a dispute arose among some people, they
would be taken to a tipi and compelled to take and hold a Sacred
Pipe.38 Since the Pipe had a sacred meaning and one had to dispel
his anger in its presence, there was a religious authority and sanc-
tion to quell the dispute. That custom could be used to settle a
dispute where the parties to the dispute agreed about the Pipe's
sacred nature and the meaning attached to it. While some Cree
people would not put aside their anger today in the presence of a
Sacred Pipe, the question is whether there are values that attach
to things in the community in a similar fashion. The use of this
custom would require knowing the beliefs of the community and, if
individuals did not accept the old way fully, knowing what commu-
nity authority would be respected. Therefore an alternative could
be a Holy Man, who has the respect of the community, sitting
down with' the people and forcing them to settle their differences.
The underlying basis for using this custom today would be the
Cree respect for holy things.
In Blackfeet tradition the private advantages of a person had
to be surrendered to public good. Police regulations allowed every
individual to enjoy equal rights to common benefits, so that no in-
dividual could claim or have special privileges.36 Societies of the
Blackfeet would administer public discipline and make certain that
the rules regarding equal rights would be obeyed. The idea of war-
rior societies may be completely impractical today, but the Black-
feet concept still has value.3 7 Given the poverty of the reservation,
a developed set of rules about access to public benefits and the
means of enforcing the access would more than likely appeal to
tribal members. In place of a warrior society there could be the
tribal court to carry on the old tradition of the warrior society.
As was the case in many Indian societies, the Navajo concept
of criminal justice was to require the offender to compensate the
35. Mandelbaum, supra note 1, at 230-32.
36. See generally G. GRINNELL, supra note 1.
37. In talking with Blackfeet leaders and tribal members, I have often heard com-
plaints about unfairness in allocating common resources and inequality in distributing bene-
fits. While these are commonly heard complaints in Indian communities, the Blackfeet have
specific traditions they can use to combat problems.
[Vol. 45
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 45 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/4
INDIAN COURTS
victim and the clan of the victim.8 The person who refused to ac-
cept the rule would be shunned from the community. This very
important principle of course grew out of a lack of jails and a rec-
ognition that physical punishment or some other form of punish-
ment did not help the victim very much. The Navajo developed a
more sophisticated method of obtaining a public recognition of
wrong, deterring through requiring the payment of a penalty in the
form of compensation (as well as a form of punitive damages in
some cases) and getting the matter over quickly so the offender
could return to the community in harmony. This principle is im-
portant today, and the Navajo tribal courts have the opportunity
to put it to work in creative ways. The Navajo courts do have the
authority to require victim compensation as a part of criminal pun-
ishment.3 9 Recognizing that there is not an identifiable "victim" in
situations such as public drunkenness or other alcohol offenses, the
court could point out that the tradition was intended to serve the
community and require an offender to pay "restitution" into a
fund to provide alcohol rehabilitation services.
The conclusion to be drawn from the fact that Indian judges
can and do apply principles derived from experience is that the
individual experience of Indian judges can be used to develop an
appropriate and independent tribal law. To date this experience
has been applied on a case-by-case basis and has not evolved into a
comprehensive body of law. This is sadly due to a lack of reported
tribal court cases.40 When Indian nations recognize that the time
has come to record valuable tribal experience for use as law, case
law and tribal codes will develop to serve the needs of the people
of those nations. For now, Indian judges should exercise their role
as community leaders and the custodians of tribal custom in the
development of an appropriate body of law.
IV. AN OUTSIDE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR INDIAN COMMON LAW
Throughout the history of Indian courts, outside intruders
have interfered with court operations and limited their activities.
In order for a tribal court to develop its own common law with any
security, the justification for that common law must be found.
Many Indian courts are clearly permitted to apply their own
38. Van Valkenburgh, Navajo Common Law (pt. 3), 11 MusEum NoTEs 37 (1938).
39. 17 NAVAJO TRmAL CoDE § 220, 1191.
40. Four notable exceptions are the Tribal Court Law Reporter, published by the
American Indian Lawyer Training Program (but discontinued), the Indian Law Reporter,
the Navajo Reporter (reports of the Navajo tribal courts), and The Navajo Law Journal (a
loose-leaf publication of decisions, legal opinions, and other materials).
19841 273
9
Zion: Indian Courts
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1984
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
tribe's customs and usages as civil law.41 Those remaining Indian
courts directly under the Bureau of Indian Affairs as Courts of In-
dian Offenses are also permitted to apply tribal customs in civil
cases.4 The problem is that most of the tribal statutory provisions
and the federal regulation call for a "sliding scale" in the applica-
tion of law in civil cases. That is, they require the tribal judge first
to look for applicable United States law, then look to tribal stat-
utes (also known as ordinances or resolutions) or customs for a so-
lution, and then go to state law if no other law can be found. It
often happens that there is no specifically applicable federal law to
be used in a tribal court dispute, the tribal code is short and does
not cover many areas, and no one even thinks of seeing if there is a
tribal custom that can be applied. This results in the use of state
statutes and case law which are confusing and which can be
manipulated by law school-trained lawyers. In many instances the
state rule of law does not adapt well to the circumstances on the
reservation or it is harsh. The answer of course is in identifying a
tribal custom or common law to be used.
Under general principles of the Indian affairs law of the
United States, Indian customs are recognized.4 3 Under the Ameri-
can rule of the reservation of sovereignty by Indian nations, tribes
have the authority to regulate all areas within their governmental
competence, and this may be done by means of custom if that is
the choice." Therefore a tribal court, ruling with the use of tribal
common law (custom), is carrying out the inherent sovereignty of
the Indian nation it serves, and its ruling is entitled to respect.",
It is important for everyone, but particularly the Indian judge,
to understand that the customs and usages of Indian tribes are
fully a part of the powers that the tribes have reserved. There may
at times be conflicts and questions of whether a particular custom
or a ruling based upon it conflicts with the laws of the overwhelm-
ing sovereign-the United States-but there is indeed the right to
apply the original laws of a tribe or people in modern tribal courts.
41. E.g. BLACKFEEr TIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE ch. 2, pt. 1, § 2; CHIPPEWA CREE LAW
AND ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 2; FORT MOJAVE INDIAN TRIBE ORDINANCES No. 16, § 110; 17 NAV-
AMo TRm CODE § 204.
42. 25 C.F.R. § 11.24 (1983).
43. See Carney v. Chapman, 247 U.S. 102 (1918); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883); In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886). See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1983)
(Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978).
44. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S.
382 (1976).
45. Tribal courts have co-extensive sovereignty with the Indian nations that create
them. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94, 96 (8th Cir. 1956).
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V. SEARCHING FOR INDIAN COMMON LAW
Several words have been used often so far, and it is important
now to pin them down. The words "tradition," "custom," and "us-
age" are used in various tribal codes, and this article has used the
words "common law." It is possible for a tradition not to be a cus-
tom or usage, and many customs and usages are not traditional.
Some traditions may be a custom. Why is that so? One legal
thinker has said that "custom is not opinion, it is practice .. "46
Another view is that a "custom" consists of the prevailing beliefs
and attitudes of a group about right and wrong, combined with a
practice or regularity of conduct.47 Therefore a "custom" for a tri-
bal judge looking for an answer would be to find how his commu-
nity feels about a certain thing and to see what is done in the com-
munity about it.
Given the confusion and argument about what custom is,
which makes it hard to define, the word "usage" gives more flex-
ibility for Indian practices and beliefs. A "usage" is something that
is actually done in the community. It is possible that a tribal judge
might know of an old ceremonial that would apply to a problem
before the court, but unless that ceremonial is known, accepted,
and used by the people of the present day, it will not be a custom
or usage. Therefore it is possible for a tradition not to fall under
the authority of the court to use as a custom or usage. On the other
hand, a judge might know of a Native American Church practice
used by people who have brought a dispute before the court, and
that practice could be used as custom or a usage under the law
even though the Native American Church belief is not traditional
to the people's tribe.
"Tradition" implies the kind of ancient practice or belief that
the English judges said existed "from time out of mind." However,
the code provisions of many Indian nations do not provide for the
use of tradition as such, but only customs and usages.
We have seen that early legal writers believed the common law
to be ancient custom. We know that is not the case, because of the
vast body of American law that in no way can be called "ancient."
Therefore judges should look to their communities and see what
people believe and accept as the tribal values of today, and see
that there is a common law justified by the words "custom" and
"usage." Common law is therefore what the community believes,
needs, and follows.
46. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, at § 606 (1916).
47. E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 224-25 (1953).
1984] 275
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The tribal court that wishes to develop its own body of Indian
common law has the problem of how to find and recognize it. The
first means of finding Indian common law is to go to the many
volumes of historical and anthropological material written about
various Indian peoples. Often these will provide useful information
and, perhaps more importantly, a certain authority for a pro-
claimed customary rule of law. There are several problems with the
use of studies, however, because the judge must have in mind what
they were and were not designed to do. Many studies recount the
situation of Indian peoples before the arrival of Europeans, and
oftentimes contemporary Indians are horrified to read what the old
methods of dealing with offenders were. The judge must know
that a traditional way may not meet the expectations and values of
the people of today. The judge must also keep in mind that re-
searchers depend on a limited number of informants, and thus may
miss out on variations of customs and beliefs.
Many tribal codes have provisions similar to the federal provi-
sion for the use of custom: "Where any doubt arises as to the cus-
toms and usages of the tribe the court may request the advice of
counsellors familiar with these customs and usages. '49
Two leading authorities on tribal courts fear the federal regu-
lation requires the pleading and proof of custom,5 0 but the regula-
tion is actually easy for the tribal judge to use. First of all, it is
clear that a judge may take judicial notice of tribal custom. The
use of counsellors hinges upon a "doubt" about a custom or usage,
and the judge can use the doctrines of judicial notice of matters of
common knowledge or certain verification and judicial notice of
law. The judge can also take judicial notice of the domestic or local
law of his or her own tribe." If the judge does not know or is not
able reliably to verify a custom, then there may be a doubt about it
and a counsellor familiar with customs or usages can be sum-
moned. Counsellors may include holy people, medicine men, el-
ders, and even ethnologists or people from a tribal cultural history
project.
The search for Indian common law is not very different from
the search for common law in most state courts. Many principles of
law are well understood and fairly undisputed, but often fine
points of law must be found when disputants present conflicting
48. See, e.g., Strickland, American Indian Law and the Spirit World, 1 AM. INDAN L.
REv. 33, 40-41.
49. 25 C.F.R. § 11.24(b) (1983).
50. Barsh & Henderson, supra note 2, at 51.
51. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 239, 330 (2d ed. 1972).
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cases in support of varying positions. The judge's decision ulti-
mately arises out of his own experience. That same situation is
found in Indian courts, and the Indian judge does only what his
White counterpart does: he or she seeks to find what the commu-
nity expects in light of contemporary life.
VI. TRIBAL COURT TORT LAW
Tribal courts were not originally intended to be a forum for
the resolution of civil matters, since they were established as in-
struments of control. However, tribal courts do hear civil matters
(sometimes refusing to treat a criminal case in a criminal fashion),
and it is important to see what the current rules of Indian tort law
are and how they fit into the idea of Indian common law. The reg-
ulations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs concerning Courts of In-
dian Offenses are common to many American tribal courts, either
directly through the regulations or indirectly through tribal code
provisions copied from them, and there are only a few principles
directly applicable to the area of tort law. It was wrongly assumed
that tribal courts would usually use state law for tort cases, and
only a few rules were made specifically to regulate the area.
The first standard for liability is: "Where the injury inflicted
was the result of carelessness of the defendant, the judgment shall
fairly compensate the injured party for the loss he has suffered. 52
The standard is "carelessness" rather than "negligence," per-
haps in order to avoid a confusing legal term. However, it has been
said that "careless" is synonymous with "negligent." 3 It was prob-
ably assumed that the tribal judge must first connect a defendant's
conduct with an actual injury and then decide whether that con-
duct was careless in light of the facts. The tribal judge need not be
concerned with fine definitions of the standard of care a defendant
owes, and the judge or the jury can hear the facts and decide
whether the conduct appeared careless under the circumstances.
The second standard for liability is: "Where the injury was de-
liberately inflicted, the judgment shall impose an additional pen-
alty upon the defendant, which additional penalty may run either
in favor of the injured party or in favor of the tribe.""
The standards of ordinary common law intentional torts under
general American law have not been repeated in the regulation,
and punitive damages (to punish for the act) can be called for
52. 25 C.F.R. § 11.24(b) (1983).
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
54. 25 C.F.R. § 11.24(c) (1983).
1984]
13
Zion: Indian Courts
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1984
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
where the injury was "deliberate," that is, "[wlilfully; with pre-
meditation; intentionally; purposely; in cold blood. ' 55 This stan-
dard actually needs no great elaboration because it also is one that
will depend upon the facts.
The final standard given in the regulations is more trouble-
some. It states: "Where the injury was inflicted as the result of
accident, or where both the complainant and the defendant were at
fault, the judgment shall compensate the injured party for a rea-
sonable part of the loss he has suffered.""
The meaning of this regulation is that where the court finds
there was no carelessness causing the injury or where both parties
were at fault, the court may still order the payment of a "reasona-
ble part" of the damages.
Because of the fact that the federal regulations have avoided
using sophisticated legal standards (possibly with the paternalistic
attitude that they would confuse tribal judges), tribal judges are
free to use community outlooks in tort cases. This is an area made
for the development of jury trials in tribal courts because there
need not be very elaborate jury instructions and. the jury needs
only to hear the evidence. The freedom of the standards is also
important because tribal judges are free (using good conscience
and acting in a good way) to hear cases and decide solely on the
facts. Even if the judge is not satisfied that the injury was "care-
less," damages may still be awarded. The conduct or foolishness of
two litigants can be balanced and measured in order to come to a
fair decision.
What is more important about the shortness and simplicity of
the regulations is that tribal courts are free to develop and apply
their own rules of common law instead of turning to state law.
Since the tribal codes and the regulations providing these rules for
giving restitution to victims do away with a need for state law, tri-
bal courts are invited to develop their own.
In common modern situations such as automobile accidents,
with problems of measuring damages, insurance coverage, and
other similar matters, a tribal court may well choose to resort to
state law where it does not conflict with tribal law or values. Like-
wise judges may wish to consider the question on a case-by-case
basis, considering such things as Indian versus non-Indian liti-
gants, the involvement of non-Indians or professional attorneys in
a case, or other unusual circumstances.
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
56. 25 C.F.R. § 11.24(d) (1983).
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The tribal judge, however, only sits in an Indian court because
it was decided it would be better to have a member of the Indian
community judge the cases of the people of that community, and
Indian judges must continually reflect the community values they
represent. Therefore, in the development of a truly Indian common
law, the judge does have the choice of looking for and finding In-
dian common law in place of state law, in order that community
values may be encouraged.
While non-Indian society may fear that the use of Indian cus-
tom is arbitrary, vague, and discriminatory, the tribal court that
develops a body of law which can be read and which provides a
means of predicting what will happen in court will gain the accept-
ance of many.
VII. INDIAN COMMON LAW IS IN THE HANDS OF INDIAN JUDGES
If a truly Indian common law is to come into being it must be
written down so it will be the same for all. While many members of
a tribe know what their customs and beliefs are, many of the
younger generation do not, and want to learn them. Likewise, non-
Indian businesses demand to know what the rules of the game are
so they can do business on reservations using them. Written court
decisions are also necessary to keep the law consistent from one
judge to the next.
As tribal courts mature the judges will be looked to as leaders
in the law, and they should be active in developing tribal law. This
will be done not only through written decisions, but in participat-
ing in the development of tribal codes. This requires telling the
tribal government what is needed and what will or will not work.
Under the old common law system the judges were the persons
who found and said what the customs of the country were. Tribal
judges should take this role and oversee the development of a com-
mon law that fits the needs of their tribe. If only state law methods
are used, there would be no need for Indian judges in Indian com-
munities. Indian common law as a reality is in the hands of Indian
communities, represented by their Indian judges.
57. On July 6, 1982, a group of primarily Anglo businessmen met at Window Rock,
Arizona, to discuss whether there is a need for the Navajo to adopt a version of the Uniform
Commercial Code. In discussing what laws can or should apply, the consensus among the
non-Indian businessmen present was that any commercial law is adequate as long as it pro-
vides predictability in business planning.
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